Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light

Abstract

We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a faked-state attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme, and outline a possible countermeasure.

arXiv comment6 pages, 5 figures

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• Bright-light detector control emulates the local bounds of Bell-type inequalities