Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

Abstract

We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategy therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.

arXiv comment7 pages, 7 figures

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• Coupled dynamics of mobility and pattern formation in optional public goods games
• A Further Analysis of The Role of Heterogeneity in Coevolutionary Spatial Games
• Deterministic and stochastic cooperation transitions in evolutionary games on networks
• Diffusion and pattern formation in spatial games