AC Loop Current Attacks Against The KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme
arXiv:2005.11002 · doi:10.1142/S0219477521500504
Abstract
A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise(KLJN) secure key exchange scheme is introduced. The attack exploits a parasitic (periodic) AC voltage-source at either Alice or Bob ends. Such situations exist due to AC ground loops and electromagnetic interference (EMI). In the low-frequency case, the procedure is the generalized form of the former DC ground loop based attack. In the high-frequency case, the power spectrum of the wire voltage is utilized. The attack is demonstrated in both the low and the high-frequency situations. Defense protocols against the attack are also discussed.
arXiv comment17 pages, 6 figures
References in corpus (57)
- Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
- Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system
- Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution
- Experimentally faking the violation of Bell's inequalities
- Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography
- Totally Secure Classical Communication Utilizing Johnson (-like) Noise and Kirchoff's Law
- After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem
- Risk analysis of Trojan-horse attacks on practical quantum key distribution systems
- Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography
- Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography
- Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination
- Homodyne-detector-blinding attack in continuous-variable quantum key distribution
- Johnson(-like)-Noise-Kirchhoff-Loop Based Secure Classical Communicator Characteristics, for Ranges of Two to Two Thousand Kilometers, via Model-Line
- Laser seeding attack in quantum key distribution
- Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch
- Decoy state quantum key distribution with imperfect source
- Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage
- Laser damage attack against optical attenuators in quantum key distribution
- Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing
- Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption
- Noise in the wire: the real impact of wire resistance for the Johnson (-like) noise based secure communicator
- Notes on Recent Approaches Concerning the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise-based Secure Key Exchange
- Insecurity of detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
- On the security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) communicator
- Implementation vulnerabilities in general quantum cryptography
- Critical analysis of the Bennett-Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise scheme
- Protection against the man-in-the-middle-attack for the Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-noise cipher and expansion by voltage-based security
- Eavesdropping and countermeasures for backflash side channel in quantum cryptography
- Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols
- Totally secure classical networks with multipoint telecloning (teleportation) of classical bits through loops with Johnson-like noise
- Generalized Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system using arbitrary resistors
- Noise properties in the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise secure communication system
- Do electromagnetic waves exist in a short cable at low frequencies? What does physics say?
- Errors and their mitigation at the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange
- Information theoretically secure, enhanced Johnson noise based key distribution over the smart grid with switched filters
- Current and voltage based bit errors and their combined mitigation for the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange
- Enhanced secure key exchange systems based on the Johnson-noise scheme
- Optimised quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
- Physical uncloneable function hardware keys utilizing Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange and noise-based logic
- Eavesdropper's ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence
- Unconditionally secure computers, algorithms and hardware, such as memories, processors, keyboards, flash and hard drives
- Effective Privacy Amplification for Secure Classical Communications
- Comment on "Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography"
- Securing vehicle communication systems by the KLJN key exchange protocol
- Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light
- Elimination of a Second-Law-attack, and all cable-resistance-based attacks, in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
- Random-resistor-random-temperature Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (RRRT-KLJN) key exchange
- On KLJN-based secure key distribution in vehicular communication networks
- What kind of noise guarantees security for the Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson-Noise key exchange?
- A universal setup for active control of a single-photon detector
- Finite-key-size effect in commercial plug-and-play QKD system
- Analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by Gunn-Allison-Abbott against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
- Resource requirements and speed versus geometry of unconditionally secure physical key exchanges
- Optical control of single-photon negative-feedback avalanche diode detector
- Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange
- Comments On "A New Transient Attack On The Kish Key Distribution System"
- Enhanced usage of keys obtained by physical, unconditionally secure distributions