Enhancement of cooperation through conformity-driven reproductive ability
arXiv:1802.01261 · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2017.06.005
Abstract
We propose a conformity-driven reproductive ability in which an individual is more (less) likely to imitate a neighbor 's strategy if 's strategy is majority (minority) in 's neighborhood. The results on the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game show that, compared to homogeneous reproductive ability, conformity-driven reproductive ability can greatly enhance cooperation. This finding is robust with respect to different types of network structures (including square lattice and scale-free network) and to different ways of strategy updating (including synchronous and asynchronous strategy updating).
arXiv comment4 pages, 5 figures
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- Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
- Reciprocity-based cooperative phalanx maintained by overconfident players