Satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution
arXiv:1707.00542 · doi:10.1038/nature23655
Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses individual light quanta in quantum superposition states to guarantee unconditional communication security between distant parties. In practice, the achievable distance for QKD has been limited to a few hundred kilometers, due to the channel loss of fibers or terrestrial free space that exponentially reduced the photon rate. Satellite-based QKD promises to establish a global-scale quantum network by exploiting the negligible photon loss and decoherence in the empty out space. Here, we develop and launch a low-Earth-orbit satellite to implement decoy-state QKD with over kHz key rate from the satellite to ground over a distance up to 1200 km, which is up to 20 orders of magnitudes more efficient than that expected using an optical fiber (with 0.2 dB/km loss) of the same length. The establishment of a reliable and efficient space-to-ground link for faithful quantum state transmission constitutes a key milestone for global-scale quantum networks.
18 pages, 4 figures
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Cited by in corpus (8)
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- Progress in satellite quantum key distribution
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- A Survey on Quantum Channel Capacities
- Quantum Image Processing and Its Application to Edge Detection: Theory and Experiment
- A Modulator-Free Quantum Key Distribution Transmitter Chip
- Experimental investigation of quantum key distribution over water channel
- Satellite quantum communications when man-in-the-middle attacks are excluded