Exploiting Faraday Rotation to Jam Quantum Key Distribution via Polarized Photons
arXiv:1905.01359 · doi:10.26421/QIC19.15-16
Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) involving polarized photons could be vulnerable to a jamming (or denial-of-service) attack, in which a third party applies an external magnetic field to rotate the plane of polarization of photons headed toward one of the two intended recipients. Sufficiently large Faraday rotation of one of the polarized beams would prevent Alice and Bob from establishing a secure quantum channel. We investigate requirements to induce such rotation both for free-space transmission and for transmission via optical fiber, and find reasonable ranges of parameters in which a jamming attack could be successful against fiber-based QKD, even for systems that implement automated recalibration for polarization-frame alignment. The jamming attack could be applied selectively and indefinitely by an adversary without revealing her presence, and could be further combined with various eavesdropping attacks to yield unauthorized information.
arXiv comment8 pages, 1 figure. References added and further discussion included of how the jamming attack could be combined with various eavesdropping attacks
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