paper

Security proof for cryptographic protocols based only on the monogamy of Bell's inequality violations

arXiv:0907.3778 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.82.032313

Abstract

We show that monogamy of Bell's inequality violations, which is strictly weaker condition than no-signaling is enough to prove security of quantum key distribution. We derive our results for a whole class of monogamy constraints and generalize our results to any theory that communicating parties may have access to. Some of these theories do not respect no-signaling principle yet still allow for secure communication. This proves that no-signaling is only a sufficient condition for the possibility of secure communication, but not the necessary one. We also present some new qualitative results concerning the security of existing quantum key distribution protocols.

4 pages, 1 figure

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