Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution sources against light-injection attacks

Abstract

A well-protected and characterised source in a quantum key distribution system is needed for its security. Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage attacks, in which an eavesdropper actively injects bright light to hack the source unit. The hacking laser could be a high-power one that can modify properties of components via the laser-damage attack and also further help the Trojan-horse and other light-injection attacks. Here we propose a countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an additional sacrificial component placed at the exit of the source. This component should either withstand high-power incoming light while attenuating it to a safe level that cannot modify the rest of the source, or get destroyed into a permanent high-attenuation state that breaks up the line. We demonstrate experimentally that off-the-shelf fiber-optic isolators and circulators have these desired properties, at least under attack by a continuous-wave high-power laser.

Abstract, Fig.5 and discussion section modified. Various minor corrections, including clarification and explanation about the experimental setup stability and its graphical representation; testing procedure; configuration of QKD systems with circulators; heating of isolators; testing results of circulators' port couples. New references added in the bibliography. 13 pages, 6 figures, 2 tables

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Cited by in corpus (18)

• Induced-photorefractive attack against Quantum Key Distribution
• Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes
• A fully passive transmitter for decoy-state quantum key distribution
• Characterisation of state-preparation uncertainty in quantum key distribution
• Quantified Effects of the Laser Seeding Attack in Quantum Key Distribution
• Effect of light injection on the security of practical quantum key distribution
• Security boundaries of an optical power limiter for protecting quantum key distribution systems
• Automated verification of countermeasure against detector-control attack in quantum key distribution
• Quantum key distribution with imperfectly isolated devices
• Quantum key distribution component loopholes in 1500-2100 nm range perspective for Trojan-horse attacks
• Intensity correlations in decoy-state BB84 quantum key distribution systems
• Quantum hacking: Induced-photorefraction attack on a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution system
• Wide-spectrum security of quantum key distribution
• Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacks
• Optical-pumping attack on a quantum key distribution laser source
• Countermeasures for Trojan-Horse Attacks on self-compensating all-fiber polarization modulator
• Source-independent quantum key distribution without pre-sending entanglement
• Pulsed laser attack at 1061 nm potentially compromises quantum key distribution