25 citations · 211 across the 56 of their papers we have counts for
72 papers
Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via -Veto Core
Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis +1
In the metric distortion problem there is a set of candidates and voters in the same metric space. The goal is to select a candidate minimizing the social cost: the sum of…
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan +1
We study best-of-both-worlds guarantees for the fair division of indivisible items among agents with subadditive valuations. Our main result establishes the existence of a random a…
Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost
Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Pandora's problem is a fundamental model in economics that studies optimal search strategies under costly inspection. In this paper we initiate the study of Pandora's problem with…
On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka
A major problem in fair division is how to allocate a set of indivisible resources among agents fairly and efficiently. The goal of this work is to characterize the tradeoffs betwe…
Ambiguous Contracts
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz +1
We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity-averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minim…
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents
Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi +2
We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired se…