25 citations · 211 across the 56 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler +2
A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for extracting revenue: when selling a single item to bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d.…
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler +2
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some , $v(S…
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim +1
We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by constructin…
Approximate Modularity Revisited
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Set functions with convenient properties (such as submodularity) appear in application areas of current interest, such as algorithmic game theory, and allow for improved optimizati…
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour +2
Exclusive social groups are ones in which the group members decide whether or not to admit a candidate to the group. Examples of exclusive social groups include academic department…
Simple Mechanisms For Agents With Complements
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern +1
We study the efficiency of simple auctions in the presence of complements. [DMSW15] introduced the single-bid auction, and showed that it has a price of anarchy (PoA) of $O(\log m)…