25 citations · 211 across the 56 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers approach the…
Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source and sink is given, and each edge is associated with s…
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica +3
We introduce a new hierarchy over monotone set functions, that we refer to as (Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs). Levels of the hierarchy correspond to the degree…
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium
Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen +1
We study equilibria of markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods and consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not gua…
Clearing Markets via Bundles
Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier
We study algorithms for combinatorial market design problems, where a set of heterogeneous and indivisible objects are priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium co…
Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan
In many multiagent domains a set of agents exert effort towards a joint outcome, yet the individual effort levels cannot be easily observed. A typical example for such a scenario i…