2 citations · 4 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers
An Introduction to Contract Theory for Computer Scientists
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
This survey introduces contract design to computer scientists: using outcome-based payments to incentivize effort. We discuss applications that motivate a computational approach to…
Online Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur +1
We introduce and study an online variant of the multi-agent contract model. In our model, agents arrive one-by-one and are active with a certain probability. Upon arrival of agent…
Black-Box Lifting and Robustness Theorems for Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Multi-agent contract design has largely evaluated contracts through the lens of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). This focus, however, is not without loss: In general, the principal can…
Combinatorial Contract Design: Recent Progress and Emerging Frontiers
Michal Feldman
Contract theory studies how a principal can incentivize agents to exert costly, unobservable effort through performance-based payments. While classical economic models provide eleg…
Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A…
Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design, paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper…
When Contracts Get Complex: Information-Theoretic Barriers
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur +1
In the combinatorial-action contract model (Dütting et al., FOCS'21) a principal delegates the execution of a complex project to an agent, who can choose any subset from a given se…
Contract Design for Sequential Actions
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
We introduce a novel model of contracts with combinatorial actions that accounts for sequential and adaptive agent behavior. As in the standard model, a principal delegates the exe…
Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang
In Bayesian online settings, every element has a value that is drawn from a known underlying distribution, which we refer to as the element's identity. The elements arrive sequenti…
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities
Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting +3
We study the classic single-choice prophet inequality problem through a resource augmentation lens. Our goal is to bound the -competition complexity of different t…
On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
We study two combinatorial contract design models -- multi-agent and multi-action -- where a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to others. In both settings, the…
Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur
We study the combinatorial contracting problem of Dütting et al. [FOCS '21], in which a principal seeks to incentivize an agent to take a set of costly actions. In their model, the…