2 citations · 2 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
cs.GT2025
Black-Box Lifting and Robustness Theorems for Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Multi-agent contract design has largely evaluated contracts through the lens of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). This focus, however, is not without loss: In general, the principal can…
cs.GT2025
Combinatorial Contract Design: Recent Progress and Emerging Frontiers
Michal Feldman
Contract theory studies how a principal can incentivize agents to exert costly, unobservable effort through performance-based payments. While classical economic models provide eleg…
cs.GT2024★ 2 cited
Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A…