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cs.GT2023
On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
We study two combinatorial contract design models -- multi-agent and multi-action -- where a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to others. In both settings, the…
cs.GT2023
Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur
We study the combinatorial contracting problem of Dütting et al. [FOCS '21], in which a principal seeks to incentivize an agent to take a set of costly actions. In their model, the…