2 citations · 4 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A…
Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design, paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper…
When Contracts Get Complex: Information-Theoretic Barriers
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur +1
In the combinatorial-action contract model (Dütting et al., FOCS'21) a principal delegates the execution of a complex project to an agent, who can choose any subset from a given se…
Contract Design for Sequential Actions
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
We introduce a novel model of contracts with combinatorial actions that accounts for sequential and adaptive agent behavior. As in the standard model, a principal delegates the exe…
Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang
In Bayesian online settings, every element has a value that is drawn from a known underlying distribution, which we refer to as the element's identity. The elements arrive sequenti…
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities
Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting +3
We study the classic single-choice prophet inequality problem through a resource augmentation lens. Our goal is to bound the -competition complexity of different t…