3 papers
cs.GT2025
One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
We study multi-agent contract design with combinatorial actions, under budget constraints, and for a broad class of objective functions, including profit (principal's utility), rew…
cs.GT2025
Budget-Feasible Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
The problem of computing near-optimal contracts in combinatorial settings has recently attracted significant interest in the computer science community. Previous work has provided…
cs.GT2025
The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka +1
Algorithmic contract design studies scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to exert effort on her behalf. In this work, we focus on settings where the agent's type is dr…