25 citations · 211 across the 56 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
On Voting and Facility Location
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Iddan Golomb
We study mechanisms for candidate selection that seek to minimize the social cost, where voters and candidates are associated with points in some underlying metric space. The socia…
On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing
Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
We study the power of item-pricing as a tool for approximately optimizing social welfare in a combinatorial market. We consider markets with indivisible items and buyers. T…
Liquid Price of Anarchy
Yossi Azar, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin +1
Incorporating budget constraints into the analysis of auctions has become increasingly important, as they model practical settings more accurately. The social welfare function, whi…
The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing
Vincent Cohen-Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman +1
Walrasian prices, if they exist, have the property that one can assign every buyer some bundle in her demand set, such that the resulting assignment will maximize social welfare. U…
Truthful Secretaries with Budgets
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi
We study online auction settings in which agents arrive and depart dynamically in a random (secretary) order, and each agent's private type consists of the agent's arrival and depa…
The Price of Anarchy in Large Games
Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier +2
Game-theoretic models relevant for computer science applications usually feature a large number of players. The goal of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for boundin…