25 citations · 211 across the 56 of their papers we have counts for
64 papers · 1 filter
Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via -Veto Core
Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis +1
In the metric distortion problem there is a set of candidates and voters in the same metric space. The goal is to select a candidate minimizing the social cost: the sum of…
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan +1
We study best-of-both-worlds guarantees for the fair division of indivisible items among agents with subadditive valuations. Our main result establishes the existence of a random a…
On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka
A major problem in fair division is how to allocate a set of indivisible resources among agents fairly and efficiently. The goal of this work is to characterize the tradeoffs betwe…
Ambiguous Contracts
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz +1
We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity-averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minim…
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents
Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi +2
We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired se…
Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the h…