activity
20102026
most citedOn a Network SIS Epidemic Model with Cooperative and Antagonistic Opinion Dynamics

82 citations · 419 across the 63 of their papers we have counts for

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7 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2018★ 2 cited

Game-Theoretic Choice of Curing Rates Against Networked SIS Epidemics by Human Decision-Makers

Ashish R. Hota, Shreyas Sundaram

We study networks of human decision-makers who independently decide how to protect themselves against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics. Motivated by studies in beha…

cs.GT2018★ 9 cited

Controlling Human Utilization of Failure-Prone Systems via Taxes

Ashish R. Hota, Shreyas Sundaram

We consider a game-theoretic model where individuals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource. We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling…

cs.GT2017

Game-Theoretic Vaccination Against Networked SIS Epidemics and Impacts of Human Decision-Making

Ashish R. Hota, Shreyas Sundaram

We study decentralized protection strategies against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics on networks. We consider a population game framework where nodes choose whethe…

cs.GT2016

The Game-Theoretic Formation of Interconnections Between Networks

Ebrahim Moradi Shahrivar, Shreyas Sundaram

We introduce a network design game where the objective of the players is to design the interconnections between the nodes of two different networks and in order to maxi…

cs.GT2015★ 63 cited

Interdependent Security Games on Networks under Behavioral Probability Weighting

Ashish R. Hota, Shreyas Sundaram

We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a…

cs.GT2015

The Strategic Formation of Multi-Layer Networks

Ebrahim Moradi Shahrivar, Shreyas Sundaram

We study the strategic formation of multi-layer networks, where each layer represents a different type of relationship between the nodes in the network and is designed to maximize…

cs.GT2014★ 41 cited

Fragility of the Commons under Prospect-Theoretic Risk Attitudes

Ashish R. Hota, Siddharth Garg, Shreyas Sundaram

We study a common-pool resource game where the resource experiences failure with a probability that grows with the aggregate investment in the resource. To capture decision making…