Game-Theoretic Choice of Curing Rates Against Networked SIS Epidemics by Human Decision-Makers
arXiv:1810.01293
Abstract
We study networks of human decision-makers who independently decide how to protect themselves against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics. Motivated by studies in behavioral economics showing that humans perceive probabilities in a nonlinear fashion, we examine the impacts of such misperceptions on the equilibrium protection strategies. In our setting, nodes choose their curing rates to minimize the infection probability under the degree-based mean-field approximation of the SIS epidemic plus the cost of their selected curing rate. We establish the existence of a degree based equilibrium under both true and nonlinear perceptions of infection probabilities (under suitable assumptions). When the per-unit cost of curing rate is sufficiently high, we show that true expectation minimizers choose the curing rate to be zero at the equilibrium, while curing rate is nonzero under nonlinear probability weighting.
arXiv commentarXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1703.08750
References in corpus (7)
- Epidemic spreading in scale-free networks
- Epidemic processes in complex networks
- Optimal Resource Allocation for Network Protection Against Spreading Processes
- In-homogeneous Virus Spread in Networks
- Interdependent Security Games on Networks under Behavioral Probability Weighting
- Fragility of the Commons under Prospect-Theoretic Risk Attitudes
- Disease dynamics on a network game: a little empathy goes a long way