activity
20092023
most citedUnderstanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Design

18 citations · 109 across the 28 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

37 papers

cs.GT2023

Selling to Multiple No-Regret Buyers

Linda Cai, S. Matthew Weinberg, Evan Wildenhain +1

We consider the problem of repeatedly auctioning a single item to multiple i.i.d buyers who each use a no-regret learning algorithm to bid over time. In particular, we study the se…

cs.GT2023

q-Partitioning Valuations: Exploring the Space Between Subadditive and Fractionally Subadditive Valuations

Kiril Bangachev, S. Matthew Weinberg

For a set of elements, we define a decreasing chain of classes of normalized monotone-increasing valuation functions from to , parameterized by a…

cs.GT2023

Tight Bounds on 3-Team Manipulations in Randomized Death Match

Atanas Dinev, S. Matthew Weinberg

Consider a round-robin tournament on n teams, where a winner must be (possibly randomly) selected as a function of the results from the pairwise matches. A tourname…

cs.DS2022

On the cut-query complexity of approximating max-cut

Orestis Plevrakis, Seyoon Ragavan, S. Matthew Weinberg

We consider the problem of query-efficient global max-cut on a weighted undirected graph in the value oracle model examined by [RSW18]. Graph algorithms in this cut query model and…

cs.GT2022

An Improved Lower Bound for Matroid Intersection Prophet Inequalities

Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Santhoshini Velusamy, S. Matthew Weinberg

We consider prophet inequalities subject to feasibility constraints that are the intersection of matroids. The best-known algorithms achieve a -approximation, even when r…

cs.CR2022★ 10 cited

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg +1

Cryptographic Self-Selection is a subroutine used to select a leader for modern proof-of-stake consensus protocols, such as Algorand. In cryptographic self-selection, each round $r…