18 citations · 109 across the 28 of their papers we have counts for
30 papers · 1 filter
Selling to Multiple No-Regret Buyers
Linda Cai, S. Matthew Weinberg, Evan Wildenhain +1
We consider the problem of repeatedly auctioning a single item to multiple i.i.d buyers who each use a no-regret learning algorithm to bid over time. In particular, we study the se…
q-Partitioning Valuations: Exploring the Space Between Subadditive and Fractionally Subadditive Valuations
Kiril Bangachev, S. Matthew Weinberg
For a set of elements, we define a decreasing chain of classes of normalized monotone-increasing valuation functions from to , parameterized by a…
Tight Bounds on 3-Team Manipulations in Randomized Death Match
Atanas Dinev, S. Matthew Weinberg
Consider a round-robin tournament on n teams, where a winner must be (possibly randomly) selected as a function of the results from the pairwise matches. A tourname…
An Improved Lower Bound for Matroid Intersection Prophet Inequalities
Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Santhoshini Velusamy, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider prophet inequalities subject to feasibility constraints that are the intersection of matroids. The best-known algorithms achieve a -approximation, even when r…
Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions
Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item for sale to multiple buyers with i.i.d. valuations. Akbarpour and Li (2020) show that the only optimal, credible, strateg…
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms
C. Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer, whose values are drawn from a known, possibly correlated prior $\mathcal{D…