3 papers
cs.GT2020
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents
Nikhil Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh Saxena +2
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary info…
cs.GT2018
A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai et al. [CDW13b], simple auctions for additive buyers […
cs.GT2016
Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints
Constantinos Daskalakis, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with m items for sale to n additive bidders with hard budget constraints, assuming that the seller has some prior distributio…