14 citations · 18 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents
Nikhil Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh Saxena +2
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary info…
A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai et al. [CDW13b], simple auctions for additive buyers […
Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints
Constantinos Daskalakis, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with m items for sale to n additive bidders with hard budget constraints, assuming that the seller has some prior distributio…
Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms
Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, w…
Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
It was recently shown in [http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.5518] that revenue optimization can be computationally efficiently reduced to welfare optimization in all multi-dimensional Baye…
On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constan…