2 citations · 2 across the 1 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
Auction learning as a two-player game
Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, S. Matthew Weinberg
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. While theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits,…
The Sample Complexity of Up-to- Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider the sample complexity of revenue maximization for multiple bidders in unrestricted multi-dimensional settings. Specifically, we study the standard model of additive…
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler +2
A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for extracting revenue: when selling a single item to bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d.…
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler +2
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some , $v(S…