activity
20092023
most citedUnderstanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Design

18 citations · 109 across the 28 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2022Show all

5 papers · 1 filter

cs.DS2022

On the cut-query complexity of approximating max-cut

Orestis Plevrakis, Seyoon Ragavan, S. Matthew Weinberg

We consider the problem of query-efficient global max-cut on a weighted undirected graph in the value oracle model examined by [RSW18]. Graph algorithms in this cut query model and…

cs.GT2022

An Improved Lower Bound for Matroid Intersection Prophet Inequalities

Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Santhoshini Velusamy, S. Matthew Weinberg

We consider prophet inequalities subject to feasibility constraints that are the intersection of matroids. The best-known algorithms achieve a -approximation, even when r…

cs.CR2022★ 10 cited

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake

Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg +1

Cryptographic Self-Selection is a subroutine used to select a leader for modern proof-of-stake consensus protocols, such as Algorand. In cryptographic self-selection, each round $r…

cs.GT2022★ 1 cited

Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions

Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item for sale to multiple buyers with i.i.d. valuations. Akbarpour and Li (2020) show that the only optimal, credible, strateg…

cs.GT2022

On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms

C. Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer, whose values are drawn from a known, possibly correlated prior $\mathcal{D…