18 citations · 109 across the 28 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Exponential Communication Separations between Notions of Selfishness
Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas +2
We consider the problem of implementing a fixed social choice function between multiple players (which takes as input a type from each player and outputs an outcome $f(t_…
Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-Implementable
S. Matthew Weinberg, Zixin Zhou
We introduce locality: a new property of multi-bidder auctions that formally separates the simplicity of optimal single-dimensional multi-bidder auctions from the complexity of opt…
On the (in)-approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer
Natalie Collina, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider a revenue-maximizing single seller with items for sale to a single buyer whose value for the items is drawn from a known distribution of support .…
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider the sale of a single item to multiple buyers by a revenue-maximizing seller. Recent work of Akbarpour and Li formalizes \emph{credibility} as an auction desideratum, an…
A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design
Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, Joan Bruna +1
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. Theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits in the…
When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase
Meryem Essaidi, Kira Goldner, S. Matthew Weinberg
We study a problem inspired by regulated health insurance markets, such as those created by the government in the Affordable Care Act Exchanges or by employers when they contract w…