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20092023
most citedUnderstanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Design

18 citations · 109 across the 28 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2019Show all

7 papers · 1 filter

cs.DS2019★ 2 cited

New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function MInimization

Andrei Graur, Tristan Pollner, Vidhya Ramaswamy +1

We consider submodular function minimization in the oracle model: given black-box access to a submodular set function , find an element of $\arg\mi…

cs.DS2019

Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples

Aviad Rubinstein, Jack Z. Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg

We study the single-choice Prophet Inequality problem when the gambler is given access to samples. We show that the optimal competitive ratio of can be achieved with a single…

cs.GT2019

Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality

Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas +1

Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and a…

cs.GT2019

Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees

Maryam Bahrani, Nicole Immorlica, Divyarthi Mohan +1

We study information aggregation in networks where agents make binary decisions (labeled incorrect or correct). Agents initially form independent private beliefs about the better d…

cs.GT2019★ 1 cited

Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence

Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin +1

We consider the manipulability of tournament rules, in which teams play a round robin tournament and a winner is (possibly randomly) selected based on the outcome of all $\bino…

cs.GT2019★ 12 cited

Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries

Pravesh Kothari, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman +2

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with items facing a single buyer. We introduce the notion of symmetric menu complexity of a mechanism, which counts the number of distin…