activity
20112026
most citedWeighted Envy-Freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation

58 citations · 867 across the 88 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

92 papers

econ.TH2026

Fractional Assignment with Preferences

Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong, Hanna Sumita +1

We study a fractional assignment setting where objects are to be assigned to agents with unit capacity, and each agent specifies an ideal distribution over the objects. Unl…

cs.GT2026

Reconfiguration in Fair Division Revisited

Fabian Frank, Warut Suksompong

We revisit reconfiguration in the fair allocation of indivisible goods, where the goal is to transform one fair allocation into another through a sequence of exchanges while preser…

cs.GT2026

Individual Fairness in Budget Aggregation

Xiaohui Bei, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger +3

We consider the problem of aggregating individual distributions over alternatives into a collective distribution, also known as budget aggregation. Existing fairness notion…

econ.TH2026

Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations

Florian Brandl, Warut Suksompong, Nicholas Teh

We consider the fair allocation of indivisible goods with binary valuations. In this setting, the maximum Nash welfare rule, the leximin rule, and all additive welfarist rules with…

cs.GT2026

Optimizing the Envy Cycle Elimination Algorithm

Karen Frilya Celine, Warut Suksompong

In the fair allocation of indivisible goods, a widely used notion of fairness is envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). A classical way to compute an EF1 allocation is the envy cycle…

econ.TH2026

Decomposition Envy-Freeness in Random Assignment

Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong, Hanna Sumita +1

In random assignment, fairness is often captured by stochastic-dominance envy-freeness (SD-EF). We observe that assignments satisfying SD-EF may admit decompositions that result in…

cs.GT2026

Envy-Free Allocation of Indivisible Goods via Noisy Queries

Zihan Li, Yan Hao Ling, Jonathan Scarlett +1

We introduce a problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (items) in which the agents' valuations cannot be observed directly, but instead can only be accessed via noisy querie…

cs.GT2025

Comparing the Fairness of Recursively Balanced Picking Sequences

Karen Frilya Celine, Warut Suksompong, Sheung Man Yuen

Picking sequences are well-established methods for allocating indivisible goods. Among the various picking sequences, recursively balanced picking sequences -- whereby each agent p…

econ.TH2025

On Multi-Level Apportionment

Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong, Steven Wijaya

Apportionment refers to the well-studied problem of allocating legislative seats among parties or groups with different entitlements. We present a multi-level generalization of app…

cs.GT2025

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods with Variable Groups

Paul Gölz, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi +1

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods with variable groups. In this model, the goal is to partition the agents into groups of given sizes and allocate the goods to the…

math.CO2025

Discrepancy Beyond Additive Functions with Applications to Fair Division

Alexandros Hollender, Pasin Manurangsi, Raghu Meka +1

We consider a setting where we have a ground set together with real-valued set functions , and the goal is to partition into two sets such that $…

econ.TH2025

Two-Sided Fairness in Many-to-One Matching

Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama, Yasushi Kawase +3

We consider a classic many-to-one matching setting, where participants need to be assigned to teams based on the preferences of both sides. Unlike most of the matching literature,…

cs.GT2025

Discrete Budget Aggregation: Truthfulness and Proportionality

Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong, Markus Utke

We study a budget aggregation setting where voters express their preferred allocation of a fixed budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these preferences int…

cs.GT2025

The Proportional Veto Principle for Approval Ballots

Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Warut Suksompong

The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winn…

cs.GT2025★ 1 cited

Asymptotic Analysis of Weighted Fair Division

Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong, Tomohiko Yokoyama

Several resource allocation settings involve agents with unequal entitlements represented by weights. We analyze weighted fair division from an asymptotic perspective: if items…

cs.GT2025

Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods

Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong

When dividing items among agents, two of the most widely studied fairness notions are envy-freeness and proportionality. We consider a setting where chores are allocated to …

cs.GT2025

Reconfiguring Proportional Committees

Chris Dong, Fabian Frank, Jannik Peters +1

An important desideratum in approval-based multiwinner voting is proportionality. We study the problem of reconfiguring proportional committees: given two proportional committees,…

cs.GT2024

Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods

Sheung Man Yuen, Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama +1

Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequenc…

cs.GT2024

On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist Rules

Karen Frilya Celine, Warut Suksompong, Sheung Man Yuen

Allocating indivisible goods is a ubiquitous task in fair division. We study additive welfarist rules, an important class of rules which choose an allocation that maximizes the sum…

cs.GT2024

Welfare Loss in Connected Resource Allocation

Xiaohui Bei, Alexander Lam, Xinhang Lu +1

We study the allocation of indivisible items that form an undirected graph and investigate the worst-case welfare loss when requiring that each agent must receive a connected subgr…

cs.GT2024

Complexity of Round-Robin Allocation with Potentially Noisy Queries

Zihan Li, Pasin Manurangsi, Jonathan Scarlett +1

We study the complexity of a fundamental algorithm for fairly allocating indivisible items, the round-robin algorithm. For agents and items, we show that the algorithm can…

cs.GT2024

Ordinal Maximin Guarantees for Group Fair Division

Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong

We investigate fairness in the allocation of indivisible items among groups of agents using the notion of maximin share (MMS). While previous work has shown that no nontrivial mult…

cs.GT2024★ 3 cited

Envy-Free House Allocation with Minimum Subsidy

Davin Choo, Yan Hao Ling, Warut Suksompong +2

House allocation refers to the problem where houses are to be allocated to agents so that each agent receives one house. Since an envy-free house allocation does not always…

econ.TH2024

Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preference Domains

Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi +1

We study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient, strategyproof…