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20112026
most citedWeighted Envy-Freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation

58 citations · 867 across the 88 of their papers we have counts for

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10 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2025

Comparing the Fairness of Recursively Balanced Picking Sequences

Karen Frilya Celine, Warut Suksompong, Sheung Man Yuen

Picking sequences are well-established methods for allocating indivisible goods. Among the various picking sequences, recursively balanced picking sequences -- whereby each agent p…

econ.TH2025

On Multi-Level Apportionment

Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong, Steven Wijaya

Apportionment refers to the well-studied problem of allocating legislative seats among parties or groups with different entitlements. We present a multi-level generalization of app…

cs.GT2025

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods with Variable Groups

Paul Gölz, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi +1

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods with variable groups. In this model, the goal is to partition the agents into groups of given sizes and allocate the goods to the…

math.CO2025

Discrepancy Beyond Additive Functions with Applications to Fair Division

Alexandros Hollender, Pasin Manurangsi, Raghu Meka +1

We consider a setting where we have a ground set together with real-valued set functions , and the goal is to partition into two sets such that $…

econ.TH2025

Two-Sided Fairness in Many-to-One Matching

Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama, Yasushi Kawase +3

We consider a classic many-to-one matching setting, where participants need to be assigned to teams based on the preferences of both sides. Unlike most of the matching literature,…

cs.GT2025

Discrete Budget Aggregation: Truthfulness and Proportionality

Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong, Markus Utke

We study a budget aggregation setting where voters express their preferred allocation of a fixed budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these preferences int…

cs.GT2025

The Proportional Veto Principle for Approval Ballots

Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Warut Suksompong

The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winn…

cs.GT2025★ 1 cited

Asymptotic Analysis of Weighted Fair Division

Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong, Tomohiko Yokoyama

Several resource allocation settings involve agents with unequal entitlements represented by weights. We analyze weighted fair division from an asymptotic perspective: if items…

cs.GT2025

Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods

Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong

When dividing items among agents, two of the most widely studied fairness notions are envy-freeness and proportionality. We consider a setting where chores are allocated to …

cs.GT2025

Reconfiguring Proportional Committees

Chris Dong, Fabian Frank, Jannik Peters +1

An important desideratum in approval-based multiwinner voting is proportionality. We study the problem of reconfiguring proportional committees: given two proportional committees,…