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20112026
most citedWeighted Envy-Freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation

58 citations · 867 across the 88 of their papers we have counts for

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econ.TH2026

Fractional Assignment with Preferences

Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong, Hanna Sumita +1

We study a fractional assignment setting where objects are to be assigned to agents with unit capacity, and each agent specifies an ideal distribution over the objects. Unl…

cs.GT2026

Reconfiguration in Fair Division Revisited

Fabian Frank, Warut Suksompong

We revisit reconfiguration in the fair allocation of indivisible goods, where the goal is to transform one fair allocation into another through a sequence of exchanges while preser…

cs.GT2026

Individual Fairness in Budget Aggregation

Xiaohui Bei, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger +3

We consider the problem of aggregating individual distributions over alternatives into a collective distribution, also known as budget aggregation. Existing fairness notion…

econ.TH2026

Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations

Florian Brandl, Warut Suksompong, Nicholas Teh

We consider the fair allocation of indivisible goods with binary valuations. In this setting, the maximum Nash welfare rule, the leximin rule, and all additive welfarist rules with…

cs.GT2026

Optimizing the Envy Cycle Elimination Algorithm

Karen Frilya Celine, Warut Suksompong

In the fair allocation of indivisible goods, a widely used notion of fairness is envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). A classical way to compute an EF1 allocation is the envy cycle…

econ.TH2026

Decomposition Envy-Freeness in Random Assignment

Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong, Hanna Sumita +1

In random assignment, fairness is often captured by stochastic-dominance envy-freeness (SD-EF). We observe that assignments satisfying SD-EF may admit decompositions that result in…

cs.GT2026

Envy-Free Allocation of Indivisible Goods via Noisy Queries

Zihan Li, Yan Hao Ling, Jonathan Scarlett +1

We introduce a problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (items) in which the agents' valuations cannot be observed directly, but instead can only be accessed via noisy querie…