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20112026
most citedWeighted Envy-Freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation

58 citations · 867 across the 88 of their papers we have counts for

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7 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2024

Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods

Sheung Man Yuen, Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama +1

Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequenc…

cs.GT2024

On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist Rules

Karen Frilya Celine, Warut Suksompong, Sheung Man Yuen

Allocating indivisible goods is a ubiquitous task in fair division. We study additive welfarist rules, an important class of rules which choose an allocation that maximizes the sum…

cs.GT2024

Welfare Loss in Connected Resource Allocation

Xiaohui Bei, Alexander Lam, Xinhang Lu +1

We study the allocation of indivisible items that form an undirected graph and investigate the worst-case welfare loss when requiring that each agent must receive a connected subgr…

cs.GT2024

Complexity of Round-Robin Allocation with Potentially Noisy Queries

Zihan Li, Pasin Manurangsi, Jonathan Scarlett +1

We study the complexity of a fundamental algorithm for fairly allocating indivisible items, the round-robin algorithm. For agents and items, we show that the algorithm can…

cs.GT2024

Ordinal Maximin Guarantees for Group Fair Division

Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong

We investigate fairness in the allocation of indivisible items among groups of agents using the notion of maximin share (MMS). While previous work has shown that no nontrivial mult…

cs.GT2024★ 3 cited

Envy-Free House Allocation with Minimum Subsidy

Davin Choo, Yan Hao Ling, Warut Suksompong +2

House allocation refers to the problem where houses are to be allocated to agents so that each agent receives one house. Since an envy-free house allocation does not always…

econ.TH2024

Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preference Domains

Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi +1

We study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient, strategyproof…