58 citations · 867 across the 88 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation
Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
We study the problem of fairly allocating a divisible resource, also known as cake cutting, with an additional requirement that the shares that different agents receive should be s…
Margin of Victory in Tournaments: Structural and Experimental Results
Markus Brill, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong
Tournament solutions are standard tools for identifying winners based on pairwise comparisons between competing alternatives. The recently studied notion of margin of victory (MoV)…
Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation
Martin Bullinger, Warut Suksompong, Alexandros A. Voudouris
Schelling's model is an influential model that reveals how individual perceptions and incentives can lead to residential segregation. Inspired by a recent stream of work, we study…
Consensus Halving for Sets of Items
Paul W. Goldberg, Alexandros Hollender, Ayumi Igarashi +2
Consensus halving refers to the problem of dividing a resource into two parts so that every agent values both parts equally. Prior work has shown that when the resource is represen…
On the Number of Almost Envy-Free Allocations
Warut Suksompong
Envy-freeness is a standard benchmark of fairness in resource allocation. Since it cannot always be satisfied when the resource consists of indivisible items even when there are tw…
Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger +3
We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model…
Closing Gaps in Asymptotic Fair Division
Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong
We study a resource allocation setting where discrete items are to be divided among agents with additive utilities, and the agents' utilities for individual items are drawn…
On the Structure of Stable Tournament Solutions
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Hans Georg Seedig +1
A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing unchosen alternatives. We prov…
How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player receiv…