58 citations · 867 across the 88 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers · 1 filter
Fractional Assignment with Preferences
Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong, Hanna Sumita +1
We study a fractional assignment setting where objects are to be assigned to agents with unit capacity, and each agent specifies an ideal distribution over the objects. Unl…
Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations
Florian Brandl, Warut Suksompong, Nicholas Teh
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible goods with binary valuations. In this setting, the maximum Nash welfare rule, the leximin rule, and all additive welfarist rules with…
Decomposition Envy-Freeness in Random Assignment
Yasushi Kawase, Warut Suksompong, Hanna Sumita +1
In random assignment, fairness is often captured by stochastic-dominance envy-freeness (SD-EF). We observe that assignments satisfying SD-EF may admit decompositions that result in…
On Multi-Level Apportionment
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong, Steven Wijaya
Apportionment refers to the well-studied problem of allocating legislative seats among parties or groups with different entitlements. We present a multi-level generalization of app…
Two-Sided Fairness in Many-to-One Matching
Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama, Yasushi Kawase +3
We consider a classic many-to-one matching setting, where participants need to be assigned to teams based on the preferences of both sides. Unlike most of the matching literature,…
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preference Domains
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi +1
We study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient, strategyproof…
Coordinating Charitable Donations with Leontief Preferences
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi +1
We consider the problem of funding public goods that are complementary in nature. Examples include charities handling different needs (e.g., protecting animals vs. providing health…
Weighted Fair Division with Matroid-Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness
Warut Suksompong, Nicholas Teh
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additi…
Extending the Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare
Sheung Man Yuen, Warut Suksompong
In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule has recently been characterized as the only rule within the class of additive welfarist rules that satisfies e…
Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Cake cutting is a classic fair division problem, with the cake serving as a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible resource. Recently, it was shown that for any number of players w…
A Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare for Indivisible Goods
Warut Suksompong
In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) rule, which chooses an allocation maximizing the product of the agents' utilities, has received substantial a…
On Maximum Weighted Nash Welfare for Binary Valuations
Warut Suksompong, Nicholas Teh
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights representing their entitlements. A natural rule in this setting is the maximum weighted Nash w…
On the Structure of Stable Tournament Solutions
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Hans Georg Seedig +1
A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing unchosen alternatives. We prov…
How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player receiv…