On Maximum Weighted Nash Welfare for Binary Valuations
arXiv:2204.03803 · doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.03.004
Abstract
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights representing their entitlements. A natural rule in this setting is the maximum weighted Nash welfare (MWNW) rule, which selects an allocation maximizing the weighted product of the agents' utilities. We show that when agents have binary valuations, a specific version of MWNW is resource- and population-monotone, satisfies group-strategyproofness, and can be implemented in polynomial time.
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Cited by in corpus (7)
- Weighted Fair Division with Matroid-Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness
- Mixed Fair Division: A Survey
- Almost Envy-Freeness for Groups: Improved Bounds via Discrepancy Theory
- Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited
- Keep Your Distance: Land Division With Separation
- Weighted Envy-Freeness for Submodular Valuations
- Asymptotic Analysis of Weighted Fair Division