Online Fair Division: analysing a Food Bank problem
arXiv:1502.07571
Abstract
We study an online model of fair division designed to capture features of a real world charity problem. We consider two simple mechanisms for this model in which agents simply declare what items they like. We analyse several axiomatic properties of these mechanisms like strategy-proofness and envy-freeness. Finally, we perform a competitive analysis and compute the price of anarchy.
arXiv comment7 pages, 2 figures, 1 table
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