66 citations · 83 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers
Fair Division meets Vehicle Routing: Fairness for Drivers with Monotone Profits
Martin Damyanov Aleksandrov
We propose a new model for fair division and vehicle routing, where drivers have monotone profit preferences, and their vehicles have feasibility constraints, for customer requests…
Two Algorithms for Additive and Fair Division of Mixed Manna
Martin Aleksandrov, Toby Walsh
We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three…
Most Competitive Mechanisms in Online Fair Division
Martin Aleksandrov, Toby Walsh
This paper combines two key ingredients for online algorithms - competitive analysis (e.g. the competitive ratio) and advice complexity (e.g. the number of advice bits needed to im…
Expected Outcomes and Manipulations in Online Fair Division
Martin Aleksandrov, Toby Walsh
Two simple and attractive mechanisms for the fair division of indivisible goods in an online setting are LIKE and BALANCED LIKE. We study some fundamental computational problems co…
Strategy-proofness, Envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency in Online Fair Division with Additive Utilities
Martin Aleksandrov, Toby Walsh
We consider fair division problems where indivisible items arrive one-by-one in an online fashion and are allocated immediately to agents who have additive utilities over these ite…
Group Envy Freeness and Group Pareto Efficiency in Fair Division with Indivisible Items
Martin Aleksandrov, Toby Walsh
We study the fair division of items to agents supposing that agents can form groups. We thus give natural generalizations of popular concepts such as envy-freeness and Pareto effic…
Monotone and Online Fair Division
Martin Aleksandrov, Toby Walsh
We study a new but simple model for online fair division in which indivisible items arrive one-by-one and agents have monotone utilities over bundles of the items. We consider axio…
Envy-freeness up to one item: Shall we add or remove resources?
Martin Aleksandrov
We consider a fair division model in which agents have general valuations for bundles of indivisible items. We propose two new axiomatic properties for allocations in this model: E…
Jealousy-freeness and other common properties in Fair Division of Mixed Manna
Martin Aleksandrov
We consider a fair division setting where indivisible items are allocated to agents. Each agent in the setting has strictly negative, zero or strictly positive utility for each ite…
Greedy Algorithms for Fair Division of Mixed Manna
Martin Aleksandrov, Toby Walsh
We consider a multi-agent model for fair division of mixed manna (i.e. items for which agents can have positive, zero or negative utilities), in which agents have additive utilitie…
Online Fair Division: A Survey
Martin Aleksandrov, Toby Walsh
We survey a burgeoning and promising new research area that considers the online nature of many practical fair division problems. We identify wide variety of such online fair divis…
Fair Division Minimizing Inequality
Martin Aleksandrov, Cunjing Ge, Toby Walsh
Behavioural economists have shown that people are often averse to inequality and will make choices to avoid unequal outcomes. In this paper, we consider how to allocate indivisible…
Almost Envy Freeness and Welfare Efficiency in Fair Division with Goods or Bads
Martin Aleksandrov
We consider two models of fair division with indivisible items: one for goods and one for bads. For goods, we study two generalized envy freeness proxies (EF1 and EFX for goods) an…
Sustainable Fair Division
Martin Aleksandrov
In this paper, I summarize our work on online fair division. In particular, I present two models for online fair division: (1) one existing model for fair division in food banks an…
Online Fair Division: analysing a Food Bank problem
Martin Aleksandrov, Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers +1
We study an online model of fair division designed to capture features of a real world charity problem. We consider two simple mechanisms for this model in which agents simply decl…