Extending the Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare
arXiv:2301.03798 · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111030
Abstract
In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule has recently been characterized as the only rule within the class of additive welfarist rules that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good. We extend this characterization to the class of all welfarist rules.
References in corpus (1)
Cited by in corpus (6)
- Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: Recent Progress and Open Questions
- Weighted Fair Division with Matroid-Rank Valuations: Monotonicity and Strategyproofness
- Truthful Cake Sharing
- Weighted Envy-Freeness for Submodular Valuations
- On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist Rules
- Characterizing Maximum Nash Welfare: Envy-Freeness and Proportionality