A Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare for Indivisible Goods
arXiv:2212.04203 · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110956
Abstract
In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) rule, which chooses an allocation maximizing the product of the agents' utilities, has received substantial attention for its fairness. We characterize MNW as the only additive welfarist rule that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good. Our characterization holds even in the simplest setting of two agents.
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