Warut Suksompong

Reconfiguration in Fair Division Revisited

Fabian Frank, Warut Suksompong

We revisit reconfiguration in the fair allocation of indivisible goods, where the goal is to transform one fair allocation into another through a sequence of exchanges while preser…

Individual Fairness in Budget Aggregation

Xiaohui Bei, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger +3

We consider the problem of aggregating $n$ individual distributions over $m$ alternatives into a collective distribution, also known as budget aggregation. Existing fairness notion…

Optimizing the Envy Cycle Elimination Algorithm

Karen Frilya Celine, Warut Suksompong

In the fair allocation of indivisible goods, a widely used notion of fairness is envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). A classical way to compute an EF1 allocation is the envy cycle…

Envy-Free Allocation of Indivisible Goods via Noisy Queries

Zihan Li, Yan Hao Ling, Jonathan Scarlett +1

We introduce a problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (items) in which the agents' valuations cannot be observed directly, but instead can only be accessed via noisy querie…

Comparing the Fairness of Recursively Balanced Picking Sequences

Karen Frilya Celine, Warut Suksompong, Sheung Man Yuen

Picking sequences are well-established methods for allocating indivisible goods. Among the various picking sequences, recursively balanced picking sequences -- whereby each agent p…

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods with Variable Groups

Paul Gölz, Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi +1

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods with variable groups. In this model, the goal is to partition the agents into groups of given sizes and allocate the goods to the…

Discrete Budget Aggregation: Truthfulness and Proportionality

Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong, Markus Utke

We study a budget aggregation setting where voters express their preferred allocation of a fixed budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these preferences int…

The Proportional Veto Principle for Approval Ballots

Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Warut Suksompong

The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winn…

cs.GT2025★ 1 cited

Asymptotic Analysis of Weighted Fair Division

Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong, Tomohiko Yokoyama

Several resource allocation settings involve agents with unequal entitlements represented by weights. We analyze weighted fair division from an asymptotic perspective: if $m$ items…

Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods

Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong

When dividing items among agents, two of the most widely studied fairness notions are envy-freeness and proportionality. We consider a setting where $m$ chores are allocated to $n$ …

Reconfiguring Proportional Committees

Chris Dong, Fabian Frank, Jannik Peters +1

An important desideratum in approval-based multiwinner voting is proportionality. We study the problem of reconfiguring proportional committees: given two proportional committees,…

Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods

Sheung Man Yuen, Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama +1

Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequenc…

On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist Rules

Karen Frilya Celine, Warut Suksompong, Sheung Man Yuen

Allocating indivisible goods is a ubiquitous task in fair division. We study additive welfarist rules, an important class of rules which choose an allocation that maximizes the sum…

Welfare Loss in Connected Resource Allocation

Xiaohui Bei, Alexander Lam, Xinhang Lu +1

We study the allocation of indivisible items that form an undirected graph and investigate the worst-case welfare loss when requiring that each agent must receive a connected subgr…

Complexity of Round-Robin Allocation with Potentially Noisy Queries

Zihan Li, Pasin Manurangsi, Jonathan Scarlett +1

We study the complexity of a fundamental algorithm for fairly allocating indivisible items, the round-robin algorithm. For $n$ agents and $m$ items, we show that the algorithm can…