Laser damage attack against optical attenuators in quantum key distribution

Abstract

Many quantum key distribution systems employ a laser followed by an optical attenuator to prepare weak coherent states in the source. Their mean photon number must be pre-calibrated to guarantee the security of key distribution. Here we experimentally show that this calibration can be broken with a high-power laser attack. We have tested four fiber-optic attenuator types used in quantum key distribution systems, and found that two of them exhibit a permanent decrease in attenuation after laser damage. This results in higher mean photon numbers in the prepared states and may allow an eavesdropper to compromise the key.

12 pages, 12 figures

References in corpus (43)

• Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution
• Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
• Beating the PNS attack in practical quantum cryptography
• Security Aspects of Practical Quantum Cryptography
• Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
• Practical Decoy State for Quantum Key Distribution
• Measurement device independent quantum key distribution over 404 km optical fibre
• Quantum key distribution over 40 dB channel loss using superconducting single photon detectors
• Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system
• Experimental measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
• Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems
• Real-world two-photon interference and proof-of-principle quantum key distribution immune to detector attacks
• Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system
• Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution over 200 km
• Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution
• Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution over untrustful metropolitan network
• Quantum Eavesdropping without Interception: An Attack Exploiting the Dead Time of Single Photon Detectors
• Long-Distance Measurement-Device-Independent Multiparty Quantum Communication
• After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem
• Breaking a quantum key distribution system through a timing side channel
• Laser damage helps the eavesdropper in quantum cryptography
• Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography
• Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination
• Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information
• Practical security bounds against the Trojan-horse attack in quantum key distribution
• Laser seeding attack in quantum key distribution
• Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch
• Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography
• Decoy state quantum key distribution with imperfect source
• Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage
• Passive faraday mirror attack in practical two-way quantum key distribution system
• Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing
• Testing random-detector-efficiency countermeasure in a commercial system reveals a breakable unrealistic assumption
• Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light
• Insecurity of detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
• Security of subcarrier wave quantum key distribution against the collective beam-splitting attack
• Faint laser quantum key distribution: Eavesdropping exploiting multiphoton pulses
• Practical security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with reduced optical attenuation
• Eavesdropper's ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence
• Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light
• Security analysis of practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems under laser seeding attack
• Hacking Alice's box in CV-QKD
• Overcoming unambiguous state discrimination attack with the help of Schrödinger Cat decoy states

Cited by in corpus (28)

• Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution sources against light-injection attacks
• Unbalanced-basis-misalignment tolerant measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
• Induced-photorefractive attack against Quantum Key Distribution
• Securing practical quantum communication systems with optical power limiters
• An approach for security evaluation and certification of a complete quantum communication system
• Hacking single-photon avalanche detector in quantum key distribution via pulse illumination
• Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes
• A fully passive transmitter for decoy-state quantum key distribution
• Comments on the "Generalized" KLJN Key Exchanger with Arbitrary Resistors: Power, Impedance, Security
• Characterisation of state-preparation uncertainty in quantum key distribution
• Experimental secure quantum key distribution in presence of polarization-dependent loss
• Strong pulse illumination hacks self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in a high-speed quantum key distribution system
• Attacking quantum key distribution by light injection via ventilation openings
• Quantified Effects of the Laser Seeding Attack in Quantum Key Distribution
• Deterministic Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol
• Effect of light injection on the security of practical quantum key distribution
• AC Loop Current Attacks Against The KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme
• Experimental study of secure quantum key distribution with source and detection imperfections
• Perspective -- On the thermodynamics of perfect unconditional security
• Security boundaries of an optical power limiter for protecting quantum key distribution systems
• Automated verification of countermeasure against detector-control attack in quantum key distribution
• Sending or not sending twin-field quantum key distribution with distinguishable decoy states
• Quantum key distribution component loopholes in 1500-2100 nm range perspective for Trojan-horse attacks
• Intensity correlations in decoy-state BB84 quantum key distribution systems
• Wide-spectrum security of quantum key distribution
• Realistic vulnerabilities of decoy-state quantum key distribution
• Source-independent quantum key distribution without pre-sending entanglement
• Pulsed laser attack at 1061 nm potentially compromises quantum key distribution