9 citations · 16 across the 25 of their papers we have counts for
26 papers
Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment
Itai Arieli, Colin Stewart
We introduce a model of persuasion in which a sender without any commitment power privately gathers information about an unknown state of the world and then chooses what to verifia…
Randomization and Efficiency under Incomplete Information
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Atulya Jain +1
We study ex-ante Pareto efficiency of feasible outcomes in games with incomplete information. Our main observation is that excessive randomization leads to inefficiency. With a non…
Persuading while Learning
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Dimitry Shaiderman +1
We propose a dynamic product adoption persuasion model involving an impatient partially informed sender who gradually learns the state. In this model, the sender gathers informatio…
Robust Price Discrimination
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon +1
We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buy…
Optimal Information Design in Sender-Receiver Cheap Talk Interactions
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having a…
The Value of Mediation in Long Cheap Talk
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
In this paper, we study an extension of the classic long cheap talk equilibrium introduced by Aumann and Hart~\citeN{aumann-hart-03}, and ask how much can the players benefit from…
Resilient Information Aggregation
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
In an information aggregation game, a set of senders interact with a receiver through a mediator. Each sender observes the state of the world and communicates a message to the medi…
Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when condit…
Reputation-based Persuasion Platforms
Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz
In this paper, we introduce a two-stage Bayesian persuasion model in which a third-party platform controls the information available to the sender about users' preferences. We aim…
A Random Dictator Is All You Need
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen +1
We study information aggregation with a decision maker aggregating binary recommendations from symmetric agents. Each agent's recommendation depends on her private information abou…
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk
Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences.…
The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller +2
In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Apply…
Mediated Cheap Talk Design (with proofs)
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment po…
Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number…
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We ask which distri…
Granular DeGroot Dynamics -- a Model for Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks
Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan +1
We study a model of opinion exchange in social networks where a state of the world is realized and every agent receives a zero-mean noisy signal of the realized state. It is known…
Sequential Naive Learning
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
We analyze boundedly rational updating from aggregate statistics in a model with binary actions and binary states. Agents each take an irreversible action in sequence after observi…
On social networks that support learning
Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky
It is well understood that the structure of a social network is critical to whether or not agents can aggregate information correctly. In this paper, we study social networks that…
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy +1
We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state, and who observe some information structure…
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
We study the implications of endogenous pricing for learning and welfare in the classic herding model . When prices are determined exogenously, it is known that learning occurs if…
The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The recent success of crowd-funding for supporting new and innovative products has been overwhelming with over 34 Billion Dollars raised in 2015. In many crowd-funding platforms, f…
Robust Forecast Aggregation
Itai Areili, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky
Bayesian experts who are exposed to different evidence often make contradictory probabilistic forecasts. An aggregator, ignorant of the underlying model, uses this to calculate her…
The Crowdfunding Game
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The recent success of crowdfunding for supporting new and innovative products has been overwhelming with over 34 Billion Dollars raised in 2015. In many crowdfunding platforms, fir…
Simple approximate equilibria in games with many players
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
We consider -equilibria notions for constant value of in -player -actions games where is a constant. We focus on the following question: What is the largest grid s…