9 citations · 16 across the 25 of their papers we have counts for
26 papers
Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment
Itai Arieli, Colin Stewart
We introduce a model of persuasion in which a sender without any commitment power privately gathers information about an unknown state of the world and then chooses what to verifia…
Randomization and Efficiency under Incomplete Information
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Atulya Jain +1
We study ex-ante Pareto efficiency of feasible outcomes in games with incomplete information. Our main observation is that excessive randomization leads to inefficiency. With a non…
Persuading while Learning
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Dimitry Shaiderman +1
We propose a dynamic product adoption persuasion model involving an impatient partially informed sender who gradually learns the state. In this model, the sender gathers informatio…
Robust Price Discrimination
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon +1
We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buy…
Optimal Information Design in Sender-Receiver Cheap Talk Interactions
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having a…
The Value of Mediation in Long Cheap Talk
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
In this paper, we study an extension of the classic long cheap talk equilibrium introduced by Aumann and Hart~\citeN{aumann-hart-03}, and ask how much can the players benefit from…