9 citations · 16 across the 25 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
The Value of Mediation in Long Cheap Talk
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
In this paper, we study an extension of the classic long cheap talk equilibrium introduced by Aumann and Hart~\citeN{aumann-hart-03}, and ask how much can the players benefit from…
Resilient Information Aggregation
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
In an information aggregation game, a set of senders interact with a receiver through a mediator. Each sender observes the state of the world and communicates a message to the medi…
Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when condit…
Reputation-based Persuasion Platforms
Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz
In this paper, we introduce a two-stage Bayesian persuasion model in which a third-party platform controls the information available to the sender about users' preferences. We aim…
A Random Dictator Is All You Need
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen +1
We study information aggregation with a decision maker aggregating binary recommendations from symmetric agents. Each agent's recommendation depends on her private information abou…
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk
Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences.…
The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller +2
In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Apply…