9 citations · 16 across the 25 of their papers we have counts for
Showing 2022Show all
3 papers · 1 filter
cs.GT2022
Mediated Cheap Talk Design (with proofs)
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment po…
econ.TH2022★ 9 cited
Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number…
cs.GT2022
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We ask which distri…