9 citations · 16 across the 25 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers · 1 filter
Persuading while Learning
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Dimitry Shaiderman +1
We propose a dynamic product adoption persuasion model involving an impatient partially informed sender who gradually learns the state. In this model, the sender gathers informatio…
Robust Price Discrimination
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon +1
We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buy…
Optimal Information Design in Sender-Receiver Cheap Talk Interactions
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having a…