5 papers · 1 filter
Mediated Cheap Talk Design (with proofs)
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment po…
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We ask which distri…
The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The recent success of crowd-funding for supporting new and innovative products has been overwhelming with over 34 Billion Dollars raised in 2015. In many crowd-funding platforms, f…
The Crowdfunding Game
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The recent success of crowdfunding for supporting new and innovative products has been overwhelming with over 34 Billion Dollars raised in 2015. In many crowdfunding platforms, fir…
Simple approximate equilibria in games with many players
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
We consider -equilibria notions for constant value of in -player -actions games where is a constant. We focus on the following question: What is the largest grid s…