4 papers · 1 filter
Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment
Itai Arieli, Colin Stewart
We introduce a model of persuasion in which a sender without any commitment power privately gathers information about an unknown state of the world and then chooses what to verifia…
Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Atulya Jain +1
We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the tot…
On social networks that support learning
Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky
It is well understood that the structure of a social network is critical to whether or not agents can aggregate information correctly. In this paper, we study social networks that…
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy +1
We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state, and who observe some information structure…