Quantum epistemology and constructivism

Abstract

Constructivist epistemology posits that all truths are knowable. One might ask to what extent constructivism is compatible with naturalized epistemology and knowledge obtained from inference-making using successful scientific theories. If quantum theory correctly describes the structure of the physical world, and if quantum theoretic inferences about which measurement outcomes will be observed with unit probability count as knowledge, we demonstrate that constructivism cannot be upheld. Our derivation is compatible with both intuitionistic and quantum propositional logic. This result is implied by the Frauchiger-Renner theorem, though it is of independent importance as well.

6 pages + 4 page appendix. Substantial revisions from original. To be published in the Journal of Philosophical Logic

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