The hidden assumptions of Frauchiger and Renner

Abstract

This note is a critical examination of the argument of Frauchiger and Renner (Nature Communications 9:3711 (2018)), in which they claim to show that three reasonable assumptions about the use of quantum mechanics jointly lead to a contradiction. It is shown that further assumptions are needed to establish the contradiction, and that each of these assumptions is invalid in some version of quantum mechanics.

arXiv comment14 pages. One change in Table 2

References in corpus (3)

• Relational Quantum Mechanics
• Quantum probabilities as Bayesian probabilities
• Single-world theory of the extended Wigner's world experiment

Cited by in corpus (12)

• Respecting One's Fellow: QBism's Analysis of Wigner's Friend
• A no-go theorem for the persistent reality of Wigner's friend's perception
• Agents governed by quantum mechanics can use it intersubjectively and consistently
• On QBism and Assumption (Q)
• Wigner's friend and the quasi-ideal clock
• A general quantum circuit framework for Extended Wigner's Friend Scenarios: logically and causally consistent reasoning without absolute measurement events
• Wigner's convoluted friends
• On the paper "Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself"
• Quantum epistemology and constructivism
• Defending Quantum Objectivity
• Comment on "Understanding the Frauchiger-Renner argument" by Jeffrey Bub
• Comment on Frauchiger and Renner paper (Nat. Commun. 9, 3711 (2018)): the problem of stopping times