The hidden assumptions of Frauchiger and Renner

Abstract

This note is a critical examination of the argument of Frauchiger and Renner (Nature Communications 9:3711 (2018)), in which they claim to show that three reasonable assumptions about the use of quantum mechanics jointly lead to a contradiction. It is shown that further assumptions are needed to establish the contradiction, and that each of these assumptions is invalid in some version of quantum mechanics.

14 pages. One change in Table 2

Cited by in corpus (12)

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• Agents governed by quantum mechanics can use it intersubjectively and consistently
• On QBism and Assumption (Q)
• Wigner's friend and the quasi-ideal clock
• A general quantum circuit framework for Extended Wigner's Friend Scenarios: logically and causally consistent reasoning without absolute measurement events
• Wigner's convoluted friends
• On the paper "Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself"
• Quantum epistemology and constructivism
• Defending Quantum Objectivity
• Comment on "Understanding the Frauchiger-Renner argument" by Jeffrey Bub
• Comment on Frauchiger and Renner paper (Nat. Commun. 9, 3711 (2018)): the problem of stopping times