Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma

Abstract

Monitoring and reporting incorrect acts are pervasive for maintaining human cooperation, but in theory it is unclear how they influence each other. To explore their possible interactions we consider spatially structured population where individuals face the collective-risk social dilemma. In our minimal model cooperator players report defection according to the loss of their interests. In parallel we assume a monitoring institution that monitors all group member and identifies wrong behavior with a certain probability. In response to these feedbacks a sanctioning institution develops punishment schemes by imposing fines on related defector players stochastically. By means of Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the introduction of monitoring and reporting mechanisms can greatly promote the evolution of cooperation and there exists a sudden change of the cooperation level by varying model parameters, which can lead to an outbreak of cooperation for solving the collective-risk social dilemma.

arXiv comment6 figures

References in corpus (16)

• Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: A review
• Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game
• Topology independent impact of noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Punish, but not too hard: How costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
• Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions
• Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding
• Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game
• Risk-driven migration and the collective-risk social dilemma
• Alliance formation with exclusion in the spatial public goods game
• The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion
• Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement
• Averting group failures in collective-risk social dilemmas
• Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility
• Binary birth-death dynamics and the expansion of cooperation by means of self-organized growth

Cited by in corpus (5)

• Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma
• Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations
• Functional Dynamics by Intention Recognition in Iterated Games
• Context-sensitive norm enforcement reduces sanctioning costs in spatial public goods games
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators