Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography

Abstract

We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only successful if a redundant resistor is included in series with the APD, or if the detector discrimination levels are set inappropriately.

References in corpus (4)

• Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination
• Quantum key distribution over 122 km of standard telecom fiber
• High speed single photon detection in the near-infrared
• Controlling passively-quenched single photon detectors by bright light

Cited by in corpus (10)

• Secure Quantum Key Distribution
• Field and long-term demonstration of a wide area quantum key distribution network
• Quantum Eavesdropping without Interception: An Attack Exploiting the Dead Time of Single Photon Detectors
• Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography
• Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography
• Measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography
• Reply to "Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography"
• Real-time monitoring of single-photon detectors against eavesdropping in quantum key distribution systems
• Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols
• Safeguarding Quantum Key Distribution through Detection Randomization